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Abstract. This article is about the religious roots of violence, in particular reli-
gious terrorism. The author argues that there is a great reluctance to study this
relationship. This is unfortunate because only on the basis of a realistic estimate
of the facts can a successful counterterrorist strategy be developed. One of the
problems with religious violence is that holy scriptures, in some passages, exhort
believers to violent acts. In combination with a theory of ethics that is known as
"divine command morality" this is problematic. Even if the holy book contains
only a small percentage of passages invoking violence they pose a problem if the
whole book is considered to be holy and the word of God.
The great scholar in Middle East-studies, Bemard Lewis, wrote: "Terror-
ism requires only a few. Obviously, the West must defend itself by what-
ever means will be effective. But in devising means to fight the terrorists,
it would surely be useful to understand the forces that drive them" (Lewis,
2003, p. xxviii).
Now, terrorists can be motivated by several factors (Guiora, 2008, p. 3).
Sometimes it is about the control of a piece of land. Sometimes the aims
are political in another sense. But the form of terrorism that requires much
attention since 9/11 is, of course, Islamist terrorism. This type of terrorism
is not primarily about land or aims we would primarily identify as "politi-
cal", but as "religious" in ·the sense that terrorists themselves present reli-
gious reasons for their terrorist acts. Although this is an unpopular state-
ment it is perfectly true. As terrorism-expert Amos Guiora writes, "religion
is certainly a primary mo~ivator for modern day terrorists". It also seems
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true, as Lewis contends, that "'Know thy enemy' must be the guiding light
for any nation-state in developing operational counterterrorism policy." So
if we want to take Lewis seriously this would bring us to the aim of un-
derstanding the relationship between religion and violence. What exactly
is that relation?
In this article the relationship between religion and violence will be
studied, against the backdrop of the most important manifestation of reli-
gious violence: Islamist terrorism. But although Islamist terrorism is the
most well known manifestation ofreligiolls violence, it can only be under-
stood if we also inquire into the nature of the theist worldview in general.
The roots of violence within Islam can only be adequately researched and
understood against the background of the roots ofviolence in the other two
theist religions: Christianity and the Jewish religion. So we should high~
light not only the Koran and other Islamic sources as relevant material for
our study, but the Bible (in particular the Old Testament) as well. .
Although a considerable number of commentators are now engaged In
studying the relationship between religion and violence, this area ofinterest
still remains highly controversial. There is, apparently, a great reluctance
among scholars and the public at large to acknowledge that ther~ c.ould be
such a connection. Many people, and certainly not all of them rehglOus be-
lievers, simply cannot accept that religion also has a dark and violen: side.
Studying the relationship between religion and violence is ev~n consIder~d
to be rude or offensive to religious sensibilities. The strategIes to explam
away the manifest connections are so prevalent that they form an interest-
ing object of study in themselves. This is also a topic of this article.
In the first section I will start with some preliminary remarks about
religion and violence. Section II tries to understand why the religious roots
of violence are so often overlooked, by comparing "religion" to what is
dearest to us: a family member or a loved one. In section In, I will try to
answer the question how we can successfully do research into the religious
roots of violence. Section IV entails an analysis of the meta-ethical theory
that is the basis of religious violence in the three theistic traditions: divine
command morality. Section V presents us with the results of this theory in
the figure of the biblical forerunner of religious terrorism (Phinehas). Se~­
tions VI and VII deal with objections that may be presented to the analysIs
elaborated in this article, while section VIII is dedicated to a comparison
between Christianity and Islam as sources ofreligious violence. As will be
made clear in this article my claim is that an analysis such as the one pre-
sented here should not be considered "anti-religious". nor "anti-Christian".
"anti-Jewish" or "anti-Islamic", but necessary in order to make a valid con-
tribution to the analysis of the contemporary roots of violence. I am not
pessimistic about the possibilities of the theistic religions refraining from
violence, but in order to be successful in this regard we have to know what
we have to look for. In other words: only a sober, objective and balanced
view of the roots ofviolence in the three theistic religions can be helpful in
this age of religious tunnoil and rising fundamentalism and fanaticism..
1. BASSAM TIBl ON RELIGION AND VIOLENCE
In earlier times violence and intimidation were regarded as necessary for
the preservation of religion. A religious war, or the torture of a heretic or
an infidel, were not considered to be morally outrageous, but necessary for
the preservation of belief and ultimately the social otder. This attitude is
not very common nowadays, at least not in the Western world. Neverthe-
less, that does not mean that people take religion to task when it seems to
be connected with violence. What the advocates of religion usually do, is
simply deny that religion has anything to do with violence as perpetrated
by e.g. terrorists (religious terrorism being the clearest manifestation of
religious violence nowadays). They say: "Religion is only superficially
involved in this type of violence. Terrorism is caused by exclusion, rac-
ism, personality disorders, social and economic inequality and lots ofother
things, but one thing is certain: this violence has nothing to do with reli-
gion." That means that the tenns "religious violence" or "religious terror-
ism" are misnomers.
When freethinkers, atheists, secularists or simply less prejudiced com-
mentators on religion point out what, according to their analysis, the re-
lationship between religion and violence amounts to, the advocates of re-
ligion, in most cases, react with dismay and even indignation. How can
anybody be so stupid as to not see that religion is only "superficially" con-
nected with the behaviour we all reject? How can we fail to understand
that bad men and women "misuse" religion for their own petty causes? If
the critic of religion persists in his indictments, the advocates of religion
usually get more impatient. They accuse him of "insulting" believers, and
they even try to silence him with blasphemy laws. Terms like "religious
terrorism" or "religious violence" are invented by the enemies of religion,
they say, namely, by the secularists, the atheists~ people who want to scoff
at religion - but religion itself, many people argue, is in its very nature pure
and pristine. But, as the Islam-scholar~ political scientist and professor of
international relations Bassam Tibi (1944- ) rightly stresses when referring
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to the sociologist Mark Juergensmeyer (2003 and 2008), "Jihadism as 'ter-
ror in the mind of God' is based on 'ideals and ideas' which are 'authenti-
cally and thoroughly' religious" (Tibi, 2008, p. 98). Time and again Tibi
warns us about the popular mistake of underestimating the relationship
between contemporary terrorism and its roots in Islamic doctrine, because
the Islamist challenge can only be met ifwe first acknowledge that parts of
the Islamic tradition are vitiated by Islamist ideology. Tibi contends this as
a Muslim and because it is necessary to separate violent tendencies from
peaceful tendencies within the Islamic tradition (Tibi, 2009).
This approach is as unpopular nowadays as was once the c~se for t~e
study of the Inquisition in relation to Catholic doctrine. The aIm of thiS
article is to present some prolegomena to a less biased attitude towards
religion. And by "less biased" I mean an attitude that tries to understand
where the violent element in religion comes from.
Let us first shoot a glance at some classic discussions about this theme
in the past.
H. CAN A FATHER CONCEDE THAT HIS DAUGHTER
COMMITTED HOMICIDE?
One of the most important historical documents on the subject of religion
in relation to morals is a dialogue by Plato: the Euthyphro CTaylor, 1977).
This starts with a dramatic scene. Euthyphro has just deposed murder
charges against his own father for the death of a servant. Prosecuting your
own father on such a charge is quite uncommon and Socrates seems very
surprised: "Good heavens!
C...) Euthyphro, most men would not know how they could do this and
be right" (Plato, Euthyphro, 4a). Socrates further inquires: "Is then the man
your father killed one of your relatives? Or is that obvious, for you woul.d
not prosecute your father for the .murder of a stranger." Now Euthyphro IS
shocked:
It is ridiculous, Socrates, for you to think that it makes any difference whe~her
the victim is a stranger or a relative. One should only watch whether the kIller
acted justly or not; ifhe acted justly, let him go, but ifnat, one should prosecute,
if, that is to stay, the killer shares your hearth and table (Plato, Euthyphro. 4c).
From a perspective of abstract justice Euthyphro may be right. But ~t
the same time it seems realistic to suppose that not all of us would act III
accordance with his high morals.
Suppose there is a father who has a lovely daughter of eighteen years.
Not a very difficult state of affairs to imagine, of course, because many
daughters are lovely in the eyes of their fathers.
On a gloomy day the police arrive at the fi:ont door of this father. What
has happened? The police inform him: "Your daughter has committed
a very serious crime: homicide," What would be his reaction?
Every father's first reaction will be one of indignation and disbelief.
This cannot be true. The people accusing his daughter - bystanders, the
police, the whole world - must have made a terrible mistake. Why? Be~
cause his daughter is no murderess, of course. Every loving father knows
that for sure. So his state of disbelief automatically transforms itself into
a state of denial.
Now let us take the step to religion. What do religions have in com-
mon with daughters? Every believer knows for sure that God is love, and
religion is the most holy thing in the world. That is also the reason why
the believer is a believer in the first place. Now there are strange people
who suddenly come up with stories about the violent aspects of religion:
scientists, scholars, freethinkers, secularists, atheists, critics of religion.
Their accounts cannot be true. They must be prejudiced by their negative
attitude towards the ha Iy creed. "Ifmy religion had a violent tendency then
I myselfwould be a potential criminal", the believer will tell us. This is too
absurd even to contemplate.
And so the loving father (or loving husband) and the true believer will
never accept that their favourites are in any way implicated in gross vio-
lence or other atrocious acts. As philosopher Brand Blanshard wrote:
Next to romantic love, religion is the area of human life where reason is most
easily swept away. Against faith, reason has little chance with the great major-
ity (Blanshard, 1984, p. 105).
Yet there are also differences between fathers and true believers. In the
state of denial that both share, the father is in a less fortunate position than
the true believer. That has to do with the nature of reality, Daughters are
humans, that is: physical entities. So homicide, as punishable by law, is
also something that can be empirically verified. And that means the loving
father, although reluctantly, has to face the facts if the evidence is as strong
as the police contend, especially if corroborated by the judge.
The situation of the true believer in his state of denial is more promis-
ing. That has to do with the nature of religion. Religion is not - as daugh~
ters are - something that can be empirically perceived. Religion is some-
thing mental, not a spatiotemporal thing. Religion is something mental,
because ideas are mental. So whether the motives of religious terrorists are
truly "religious" is a matter of interpretation. And for the true believer, so
it seems, there are always routes of escape. He can always (and will often)
say: "it 'was not religion, it was culture, social position, mental condition
and many other things", but not religion that was the cause of the trouble.
This attitude was aptly formulated by the philosopher Herbert Spencer
(1820-1903), himself an agnostic, when he said:
The truly religious element of Religion has always been good; that which has
proved untenable in doctrine and vicious in practice, has been its irreligious ele-
ment; and from this it has been undergoing purification (Spencer, 1995, p. 3).
So religion is good, according to Spencer. What seems bad in religion
is simply "irreligious".
Of course, numbers count. You cannot say a religion is violent because
only a few believers make a totally unwarranted connection between their
criminal behaviour and their religion. But if during 'the 16th and 17th cen~
tury witches, heretics and infidels were burnt at the stake and religious and
political leaders adduced theological reasons provided by scriptur~, ~ou
cannot say: "this has nothing to do with religion". In those days ChnstIan-
ity was a violent religion. Because nowadays witches, heretics and infidels
are not burned anymore, we should say that contemporary Christianity is
much less violent than its predecessor in the 16th and 1TJI century. But what
we should not do - as the apologists of religion want us to do - is say that
because nowadays Christianity has lost many of its violent characteristics
the violence perpetrated in earlier times had nothing to do with religion.
, To substantiate my claim, let us turn back to the quote from Spencer.
Suppose we substitute the word "capitalistic" for "religious" and "capi-
talism" for "religion". What would be the consequence? In that case we
would get a sentence like the following:
The truly capitalistic element of Capitalism has always been good; that which
has proved untenable in doctrine and vicious in practice, has been its 'uncapi-
talistic' element; and from this it has been undergoing purification.
Someone saying this would be laughed out of court. Political ideo-
logies, like life- and worldv.iews, have a social aspect that may and m~st
be evaluated, everybody would tell us. Why should we make an exceptIOn
for religion?
There may be a good reason for this. That reason could be that a reli-
gious worldview differs structurally from all other worldviews. An? that
difference (we have to emphasise this) has to be relevant to underpm the
Ill. HOW TO DISCOVER A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
RELIGION AND VIOLENCE
How can this dispute about the relationship between religion and violence
be solved? Can it be solved at all? Or will this always remain a matter of'
opinion, reflecting the personal life stances of the disputants? There are at
least two ways, so it seems, to discover if there is such a relationship and,
if so, what its nature is.
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norm t~a~ religious ~o.r1dviews should be exempt from criticism whereas
non-relIgIOus worldvlews can be evaluated in the light of the behaviour of
their adherents and the character of their basic doctrines. Such argumenta-
tion may be possible. We should never exclude the possibility that someone
presents us with a spectacular analysis (it surely would be) making exactly
this point. As long as this is not the case, however, we have reasons to be
sceptical and there is reason to critique the attitude that Spencer advocates
and is being taken for granted by so many people.
The first "research-strategy," for inquiring into this matter could be: to
look whether a certain religion is in possession of a revealed holy book on
which the adherents of that religion base their beliefs and moral behaviour.
This is indeed the case with the Jewish, Christian and Muslim religions.
The so-called "theistic faiths" are "religions of the book". Those religions
have a special relationship with three books that reveal the truth about
God's wishes with regard to mankind. Those hooks are: the Old Testament,
the New Testament and the Koran. The Old Testament is the most impor-
tant book for the Jews. The New Testament is ofparamount importance for
Christians. The Koran, last but not least, is the Holy Book for Muslims.
Whoever wants to veritY whether religion (or a religion) condones or
even stimulates 'violence should consult those books and, try to ascertain
whether (and under what circumstances) violence is pennitted or even en-
couraged in the texts. Once this study is undertaken, perhaps backed up
with the relevant literature on religion and violence, such as the books
Sacred Fury by Charles Seelengut (2003) or a book with the ominous title
Is Religion Killing us? by Jack Nelson-Pallmeyer (2003), every reader will
see that there is much more in the holy writ than just the Sermon on the
Mount.
I will not back up this contention with the many passages that are
elaborately expounded on and analyzed in works by authors like Nelson-
I
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Pallmeyer, Seelengut, Sam Harris (2005), Shadia B. Drury (2004), Joseph
Hofmann (2006), Christopher Hitchens (2007), lames Haught (1995, 1990)
and many other commentators.
It suffices to illustrate this point with some remarks on only two pas-
sages from holy books: one from the Koran, the other from the Bible. I will
start with the youngest revelation: the Koran.
In the Koran (24:2) there is a passage on adultery and fornication. The
passage runs as follows:
The woman and the man guilty of adultery or fornication, flog each of them
with 100 stripes: Let no compassion move you in their case, in a matter pre~
scribed by Allah, ifyou believe in Allah and the Last Day.
This passage was the subject ofa discussion, in the Eastern and Western
world, concerning a 20-year-old woman from Qatif, Saudi Arabia, reported
to have been abducted by several men and repeatedly raped. Judges found
that the victim was, herself, guilty. Her crime is called "mingling". When
she was abducted the woman was sitting in a car with a man not related to
her by blood or by marriage. This is illegal in Saudi Arabia. She was sen-
tenced to 200 lashes with a bamboo cane (Hirsi AIi, 2007).
This sentence will be described by many people as draconian, outra-
geous or unjust. Why is the woman sentenced in this harsh way? Because
the Saudi law prescribes this sentence for this specific offence. But why is
the Saudi law so cruel in this matter? The reason is obvious: because this
penalty is prescribed in the Koran.
The Koran is not the only Holy Book that provides compelling reasons
for a very harsh - by contemporary standards - treatment of offenders of
the law. A good place to start our argument on the scriptural foundations
of violence in the Bible is with Deuteronomy 13: 1-3 ("a warning against
idolatry", as the English Standard Version euphemistically puts it). There
we find the following passage:
If a prophet or a dreamer of dreams arises among you and gives you a sign or
a wonder, and the sign or wonder that he tells you comes to pass, and ifhe says,
"let us go after other gods", which you have not known, "and let us serve them",
you shall not listen to the words of that prophet or that dreamer of dreams.
The attitude exemplified in this passage cannot come as a shock- to
a well-informed reader. Every faith will discourage its devotees from going
after other gods. Every religion tries to keep its community together and
so does the Jewish religion. The Bible says: "You shall walk after the Lord
your God and fear him and keep his commandments and obey his voice,
and you shall serve him and hold fast to him" (Deut. 13: 4-5).
IV. DIVINE COMMAND MORALITY AND THEISM
The theory of ethics that is implicit in this passage is what has been called
the "divine command theol)''' of ethics (Idziak, 1979). It holds that the
believer is supposed to follow the ethical injunctions that are revealed by
God, manifested in Scripture. There is a problem though. Doing this can
imply tensions with what we consider morally appropriate or what is le-
gally required or forbidden by civil law or "human law" (as contrasted with
"divine law"). This is e.g. the problem that Abraham faces when ordered
by God to sacrifice his son (Genesis 22).
So far, Deuteronomy has suggested nothing that can be considered
problematic in the sense of violating the moral or civil law, but in Deuter-
onomy 13:5 there is a turn. After the turn, we read:
But that prophet or that dreamer ofdreams shall be put to death, because he has
taught rebellion against the Lord your God, who brought you out of the land
of Egypt and redeemed you out of the house of slavery, to make you leave the
way in which the Lord your God commanded you to walk. So you shall purge
the evil from your midst" (Deuteronomy 13: Sk6).
So the prophet or the dreamer of dreams "shall be put to death".
If this is interpreted as a description of what will happen after death,
this text may still be compatible with contemporary civil and penal law for
these are only applicable to the situation here on earth. It is not very polite
perhaps to tell other people that they will burn in hell for what they believe
or not believe, but as long as the furnace is not ignited in this life these
visions about what happens in the hereafter do not have to give us great
worry. It appears from the context, however, that the Bible is not simply
making a factual statement about what will happen to our souls in a future
life, but admonishes the believers in this world to execute the false prophet
or the "dreamer of dreams" among the living. That means: the individual
believer is exhorted - in contemporary jargon - to "take the law into his
own hands" and purge the community of false prophets.
That the Bible takes this point seriously is clear from further commen-
tary on the way this prescript should be intefpreted. There it appears that
this injunction is not restricted to unknown people but should also be ap-
plied to those most intimate and dear to us. Our brother, our son, daughter,
wife or friend - they should all be put to death if they preach rebellion
against the Lord. In I?euteronomy 13:6-12 we read:
If your brother, the son of your mother, or your son or your daughter or the
wife you embrace or your friend who is as your own soul entices you secretly,
-'
Everyone has the right to freedom ofthought, conscience and religion; this right
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or
in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or
belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance" (italics added; PC).
So here we have a manifest contradiction between modern constitu-
tional texts such as The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and "Holy
Scripture" as handed down by the ancient religions of the book.
That contradiction is not restricted to the matter ofapostasy. The text in
Deuteronomy also has a completely different opinion about taking the law
into your own hands than the modern state does. Deuteronomy presents no
saying, "let us go and serve other gods", which neither you nor your fathers
have known, some ofthe gods of the peoples who are around you, whether near
you or far off from you, from one end of the earth to the other, you shall not
yield to him-or listen to him, nor shall your eye pity him, nor shall you spare
him, nor shall you conceal him. But you shall kill him. Your hand shall be first
against him to put him to death, and afterwards the hand of all the people.
You shall stone him to death with stones, because he sought to draw you away
from the Lord your God, who brought you out of the land ofEgypt, out of the
house ofslavery. And all Israel shall hear and fear and never again do any such
wickedness as this among you.
"Warning against idolatry" is an unduly euphemistic qualification of
what we find here, so it appears. It is a warning to idolaters, false prophets,
and dreamers of dreams, but the text also spells out in no uncertain tenns
what has to be done with them. They deserve the death penalty. And the
execution of this death penalty is not reserved for God in the hereafter, but
the text proclaims it to be the specific duty of all members of the Jewish
tribe to execute this death penalty.
Furthennore, we should not be distracted from our religious duties
when the false prophet is our son, our daughter, brother or wife. Especially
when it comes to those dear to us: we should be the first to throw the stone,
the rest ofthe community has to follow.
In modem terminology we should qualify this as a prohibition of apos-
tasy (Zwemer, 1924; Ibn Warraq, 2003; Jami 2007; Ahadi, 2008). When we
compare this provision in the Bible with modem constitutions and modern
text-books of penal law there is a manifest contradiction. Modern con-
stitutions and treaties on human rights proclaim the freedom of religion.
That freedom also comprises the freedom to reject one specific religion
or relinquish all religions. This is stated clearly in art. 18 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (1948):
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guiding rules for how an earth-bound government has to deal with the mat-
ter of apostasy; it does not even refer to God. It is the individual member
of the community who is assigned to be law officer and executioner. We all
have to ston'e the apostates and those inciting others to embrace the false
gods ourselves.
Obviously, this would be detrimental to civil order and to the principle
of free speech. And this would not only be detrimental to the modern civil
order, by the way, but it would also have undermined ancient states and
communities. No state, whether ancient or modern, can condone violence
perpetrated by citizens themselves (Weber, 1966, p. 27). We find a clear
example ofwhat this would imply in the biblical story of Phinehas.
V. THE STORY OF PHINEHAS: BIBLICAL TERRORISM
The story of Phinehas is told in the book of Numbers. Numbers 25 is
dedicated to Baal Worship at Peor. While Israel lived in Shittim, the peo-
ple of Israel began "to whore with the daughters of Moab", the Bible in-
forms us. These invited the Israelites to the sacrifices of their gods, and
those "daughters of Moab" apparently had considerable success with their
invitations because the Israelites "bowed down to their gods" (Numbers
25: 2). The Bible spells out what this means: "So Israel yoked himself to
Baal of Pear".
This made the Lord angry. He directed himselfto Moses and said: "Take
all the chiefs of the people and hang them in the sun before the Lord, that
the fierce anger of the Lord may turn away from Israel."
Moses took action and said to the judges of Israel: "Each of you kill
those of the men who have yoked themselves to Baal ofPeor."
It is not so clear whether Moses' last command is identical to what the
Lord commanded. The Lord seemed to exact the killing and punishment
of all the chiefs. Moses, though, seems to build in a proviso: he ordered
the killing of only those who had actually yielded' to the temptation of the
daughters of Moab. So for Moses a precondition for punishment was per-
sonal guilt (mens rea). From a modern perspective this seems almost self-
evident, but not everybody in the community was satisfied with the way
Moses handled the matter. There was a certain Phinehas who defied Moses'
authority and took the law into its own hands. The immediate occasion for
this was the following.
Phinehas saw how one of the men ofIsrael brought a Midianite woman
to his tent. (Numbers 25: 6). When Phinehas saw this, he rose and left
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the congregation and took a spear. He "went after the man of Israel into
the chamber and pierced both of them, the man of Israel and the woman
through her belly" (Numbers 25: 8).
So far, we only have an exCiting, although gruesome, story. What makes
the story interesting, however, is the Lord's reaction. What did God say
about Phinehas slaying the people who, according to modern standards,
were perfectly justified in praying to gods of their own choosing ( since
they are protected by the freedom of religion, after all)? The Lord sided
with Phinehas and Moses' authority was clearly defied on the basis of the
subsequent yvents. The Lord said to Moses: "Phinehas the son of Elea-
zar, son of Aaron the priest, has turned back my wrath from the people of
Israel" (Numbers 25: 10). Phinehas was even rewarded for the man and
woman's public execution without trial. The Lord said:
Behold, I give to him my covenant of peace, and it shall be to him and to
his descendants after him the covenant of a perpetual priesthood, because he
was jealous for his God and made atonement for the people of Israel (Numbers
25: 13).
So those who flout the legitimate authority of the temporal leaders of
the people (Moses) are rewarded by God. Apparently, Phinehas' religious
zeal is appreciated more by God than Moses' cautious way of dealing with
the matter. This stance can have (and is likely to have) grave consequences.
This can be seen as substantial encouragement to those who claim spe-
cial knowledge of God's will and are prepared to perpetrate violence in
defiance of the traditional political leaders of the state. Phinehas can be
seen as the archetypical religious terrorist. Phinehas is prepared, on reli-
gious grounds ("1 know what God wants") to use violence a~ainst c.it,izens
of the state, thereby violating the law of the state and defymg legltlmate
authority. That is the essence of the religious terrorist. As Amos Guiora
rightly states: "terrorism is the conflict between nation-states and non-state
entities" (2008, p. 4). Phinehas was such a non-state entity. Yigal Amir
was another. When Yigal Amir killed Yitzak Rabin in 1995 on the basis of
religious considerations, or when contemporary Islamist terrorists kill or
intimidate people because their victims are accused of "blasphemy" (cf.
the Danish cartoonists or the Dutch writer Theo van Gogh) this all adheres
to the same pattern. The religious terrorist wants to "punish" or intimidate
the blasphemer and instil fear into the hearts of the citizenry.
What makes the story both interesting and disconcerting at the same
time is the fact that Phinehas' ruthless behaviour is more appreciated by
the Lord than the way Moses had handled the matter. After all, Phinehas
":[
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brought the people of Israel back on the right track, the Bible tells us. The
people ofIsrael are expected to serve one God and one God only; the Lord.
In the Ten Commandments this is put thus: "You shall have no other gods
before me" (Exodus 20:3).
It is clear that this attitude and the whole worldview connected with
it is hard to reconcile with modem freedom of religion, freedom of wor-
ship, freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, free inquiry and other
fundamental rights ingrained in the concept of liberal democracy. It is, of
course, possible to acknowledge the prohibition ofvenerating strange gods
as a private religious command, but the state cannot act upon this political
morality without violating modem human rights.
VI. BIBLICAL VIOLENCE AND MODERN LEGAL PRACTICE
The problem with Holy Scripture (used as a comprehensive term for the
Koran and the Bible as well) is that - at least when taken in a literal way -
it fails to educate citizens. It defines people as members of a religious com-
munity. It tells them that their highest moral commitments are those for-
mulated by their own god. As long as the moral injunctions of the religious
community are the same as the laws and morals of the national ,community
the inherently problematic nature of this point of view is obscured, but
once they diverge a problem arises. What should the sincere believer do?
What precepts should he follow? Here we have the essence of the religious
believer's problem. And this problem is clearly described and also pro-
vided with a solution (although it may not be "our" solution) in the biblical
and Koranic stories. The primary moral responsibility of man is towards
his religious community or - what amounts to the same - to his God.
Although contemporary states in the western world are not directly based
on religious Scripture they have been developed against the background of
theistic culture. And that makes them vulnerable to the type of logic that
inheres in the great theistic creeds. Not only is Sura 24:2 influential in
contemporary Saudi Arabia but Deuteronomy 13 also has some bearing on
the actual course ofevents in this world. Compared to the passage from the
Koran, the passage from Deuteronomy probably has less influence in, e.g.,
a Western country than Sura 24:2 has in Saudi Arabia. There are no Chris-
tian states (the United States of America, for instance) or Jewish states
(Israel, for instance) where the freedom ofreligion is curtailed on the basis
ofDeuteronomy 13. But let us phrase the question slightly differently: is it
likely that Deuteronomy 13 still manifests a certain influence on our penal
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law, for instance in clauses about blasphemy'? If phrased in this way, the
answer is probably affinnative. The Dutch penal code still has a provision
for blasphemy in article 147 (which the government has indicated it wishes
to abolish within the foreseeable future while at the same time extending
the ambit of another article that penalizes incitement to religious hatred).
This article is almost a dead letter because the Central Prosecutors Of-
fice is not very active in bringing cases of blasphemy before the court. But
the possibility still exists and this has something to do with the religious
past of Europe. So Deuteronomy 13 (and other passages) certainly had
influence on the suppression of freedom ofspeech and freedom ofreligion
in the world of Christianity, although that influence was much more perva-
sive in the 16th and 17th centuries than it is now. From 1559 until 1966 the
Catholic Church upheld the Index librorum prohibitorum. Until 1820 the
Inquisition was active and deterred many dissidents from heterodoxy and
heresy. Should we say that those practices were not in any way related to
Christian Holy Scripture? Is there no relationship between passages such
as Deuteronomy 13 and the Inquisition? That is hardly credible. Jesus says:
"And ifyour right hand causes you to sin, cut it off and throw it away. For
it is better that you lose one of your members than that your whole body
go into hell" (Matth, 5:30). Once we identify society with the "body" and
the individual with the ~'hand" the suggestion arises that the heretic should
be eliminated from society in order to forestall the perdition of the whole
community, precisely as was advocated in Deuteronomy 13.
Of course, other interpretations are possible. But that is not the point.
The point is that an interpretation such as I have presented here is not ludi-
crous, and this is the way this passage has been interpreted in the past. We
may like to forget this, but that is not a sensible course to follow. In a time
when radicalism is on the rise we have to be prepared that some religious
believers may present such radical interpretations.
There is probably the same relationship at work here as between the
flogging ofworrien in Saudi Arabia and Sura 24:2. Again, religion does not
exist "per se", as a metaphysical entity in a transcendent realm of ideas,
but is a social force that acts on the morals, politics and judicial system of
its believers.
Many apologists for religion, especially ofthe liberal brand, vehement~
ly deny this. Any supposed relationship between the actual suppression of
freedom of conscience and freedom of religion and the scriptural passages
manifesting the same attitude (Deuteronomy 13) is denied. Those practices
are "cultural", but have nothing to do with religion as such. But we may
wonder whether the apologists for religion are not simply fooling us and
themselves as well. If believers declare their Scripture to be "holy" it is
very likely that they really mean what they say: "holy". And one of the
consequences of this is that they consider the content of their Holy Scrip-
ture as relevant for their ethical convictions.
Although that insight is not very popular, this should not scare us off.
The only thing that should guide us is the truth.
That ideal should be pursued not only because of the loftiness of the
ideal in itself but because an effective reformation of religious thought
can only be accomplished on the basis of a realistic estimate of what the
problems are.
VII. THE BOOK OF HISTORY
In the previous pages we have been concerned with revealed Scripture
as a source of information about the characteristics of a religion. But, as
I have said before, a religion is not only what is "in the books". It is al-
so what manifests itself in history. That is why we should not only read
from the "book ofrevelation" but also from the "book of history". In other
words, we have to read Joseph Hoffmann on The Just War and Jihad if we
want to be informed on "violence in Judaism, Christianity & Islam", as the
subtitle of his book reads. Or we must consult Efraim Karsh on "Islamic
Imperialism" (2006),
It is only those books that can give us an idea ofthe connection between
religion and violence. The major problem, however, is not that these books
are contested, but that they are ignored by many people. The vast majority
of people reading about religion prefer to read literature that places reli-
gion in the most favourable light, such as the books by Karen Armstrong
(2007).
Assessing the violent aspects of religion does not rule out, of course,
that religion has stimulated many positive developments in world history,
The American Declaration of Independence starts with the ringing words:
"We hold these truths to be self·evident, that all men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights" (italics
are mine; PC). Here we find the basis for the American system of law: all
men are created equal. The drafters of the Declaration state that because of
this status as a creature ofGod, the human being is in possession of inalien-
able rights. This is a great idea! Every single human being is the bearer of
certain fundamental rights that cannot be denied by the government. This
idea changed the whole course of history and, we can safely say, this was
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the la~ into h.is own ha~d~ and executed what he thought was the only ap-
propnate pUnishment: kIlhng the people who had violated the law of God.
We have also seen that the Lord, according to the story, did not disapprove
of what Phinehas had done but that he was even rewarded.
With the story of Phinehas I have tried not only to demonstr~te that
Holy Scripture sometimes advocates atrocious acts (which could be illus-
trated by other examples as well), but to give an idea of what could be
called a "religious terrorist", A religious terrorist is someone who defies
the legitimate authorities of the state, does not acknOWledge the law of the
state, and, based on Scripture, draws his own conclusions, even ifthese are
radical indeed.
The common reaction to the line of argument set out in this article is
that ofthe group ofpeople who think religion has no real influence on what
happens in the world. Those people will say that it is no problem that some-
times old books tell strange stories or advocate misdeeds because no sen-
sible person would take these stories seriously. This group is composed of
believers and unbelievers alike. Why unbelievers tend to think along these
lines is clear: unbelievers tend to underestimate the importance of Holy
Scripture. They afe unbelievers, after all. They find it difficult to under-
stand that people are seriously convinced that mingling should be punished
by lashes simply because this is prescribed in an old book. And that people
should be killed because they have changed from one religion to another
("Take all the chiefs of the people and hang them in the sun before the
Lord", as prescribed in Numbers 25) will be considered· by many people
as utterly repulsive. Also, taking the law into your own hands and execut-
ing these cruel prescripts, as Phinehas did, is beyond the wildest dreams of
most moral agents. But here comes my point: this is in fact so far beyond
the wildest dreams of ordinary people that they tend to think that nobody
can take Scripture seriously if it prescribes immoral deeds. And so they
are not worried at all by draconian measures as prescribed in Scripture.
They belittle the significancf) of this by telling us that it is only a "matter
of interpretation". Or, they will tell us that the overwhelming majority of
believers are not inclined to perpetrate immoral acts on the basis of Scrip-
ture. The conclusion they draw from this fact is that because numerically
the extremists are such a small group we should not worry too much about
those stories, which are considered to be "just stories" or "just texts".
What can we say of this? In fact, this argument has already been an-
swered. I have shown that Sura 24:2 certainly has a modicum of influence
in some places in the world (to phrase it very cautiously). There are places
in the world, for instance, where Sura 24:2 is even more important than
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One of the things that make theism problematic is that theism is easily
interpreted as the doctrine that a personal god exists who has revealed his
will in Holy Scripture, which must be followed no matter what the conse-
quences will be. I have illustrated this by referring to some examples de-
rived from two important holy scripture's: the Koran and the Bible. The first
example was Koran 24:2 stating that an adulterer and an adulteress shall
each be punished by 'whipping. A second example was a text from Deuter-
onomy 13: 5-6, indicating that a prophet seducing the people of Israel to
adore strange gods should be put to death. The example from the Bible was
backed lip by another passage from the Bible, but this time a "story": the
sto1)' of Phinehas, as told in Chapter 25 of the book ofNumbers. Phinehas
is an interesting figure, because he murdered two people (one of his fellow
Israeli men and one woman from a different tribe) who he deemed guilty of
adoring false gods (Le. not the god ofIsrael). And the legitimate authority,
Moses, did not act in accordance with what Phinehas thought should be the
appropriate reaction: a swift and extra-legal execution. So Phinehas took
VIII, THE TWO BOOKS ARGUMENT
a change for the better. Pragmatists might say: "You see? The idea of God
as a creator is very useful. It brought us the idea of inalienable rights." This
pragmatist is right, to a certain extent. But we can, of course, also consider
the question whetherit would be possible to defend the idea of inalienable
rights without the idea of a Creator. Is that possible too? If the people in
1776 accepted inalienable rights as a gift of God, does that imply that we,
living in the 21 sI century, still have to believe in the same connection to
sustain the notion of human rights for the future? Or can we adopt inalien-
able rights and proclaim our own non-theistic foundation?
This is important, because, as we have seen in this chapter, religion has
an evil side that ought to be criticized. The attempt to argue that the evil
sides of religion are simply "not religious", as Herbert Spencer and many
others have done, is simply not convincing. Religion has to be subjected to
criticism because only when this is accomplished can religion be purified
of its nastier aspects.
Religious criticism should be fair, but straightforward. Limiting reli-
gious criticism within the confines that liberal interpretation wants to ac-
knowledge is not enough. If we maintain the myth of authoritative scrip~
ture, as even the "moderate'1 or "liberal" believers do, we will make little
progress.
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the law of the land. That is because the law of the land should always be
interpreted against the backdrop of Sura 24:2 or, ifit contradicts Sura 24:2,
the law is considered illegitimate.
That brings me to a third objection. There will be people who argue as
follows: "All right, you made your point with Sura 24:2,' but with the bib~
Heal passage from Deuteronomy and the story of Phinehas you were less
convincing." This group will point out that there is a "great difference"
between the Koran and the Bible. They are both called "holy books" and
at a superficial level there are some similarities, but the differences are
greater than the similarities. And these differences are especially important
for the matter of religious violence.
There is a host of differences that one can refer to, and my list of these
disparities will not be exhaustive, but sufficient to understand what the
matter is all about.
It may be possible to say: "The Bible is not one book, but two. And the
second book, the New Testament, has mitigated the stern passages from the
first book, the Old Testament." It is clear that Christians especially (and not
orthodox Jews) will be likely to refer to the "two-books-argument". So as
a reaction to the story about Phinehas in the Old Testament it may be pos-
sible to point to Romans 13 from the New Testament. There we read: "Let
every person be subject to the governing authorities. For'there is no au-
thority except from God, and those that exist have been instituted by God.
Therefore whoever resists the authorities resists what God has appointed,
and those who resist will incur judgment" (Romans 13: 1-3). This seems
a good answer to the "anarchistic" story of Phinehas who rebelled against
the legitimate authority of Moses. If Phinehas would have read Romans
13 he could have known that he should not have resisted the authority of
Moses who was governing him.
It would also be possible perhaps to point to the well-known passage
on Caesar and Christ. Matthew 22:21 fonnulates it as follows: "Therefore
render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are
God's." In taking this passage as our point ofdeparture and not Romans 13,
it might be possible to argue, perhaps, that Phinehas was a kind of "spirit-
ual authority" and that Moses was the worldly leader. Phinehas should not
have claimed such a worldly affair as the administration of earthly justice.
That is the province of Moses. Phinehas should only have proclaimed that
the Israelites who prayed to the wrong gods forfeited their place in heaven
or became fit for some punishment in the world hereafter. But by claiming
worldly power he violated the principle of the separation of church and
state that Jesus Christ so notoriously inaugurated.
A second difference between the Bible and the Koran that is often re.
ferred to is that the Bible does not speak directly to people in this time. Its
message is, so to speak, much more indirect. To substantiate that contention
one can, again, refer to the story of Phinehas. This is a story. And stories
have to be interpreted. The Bible does not tell contemporary Christians or
contemporary Jews that they should now kill all the apostates or those who
want to change from one religion to another. The story from Deuteronomy
tells us something about Jewish history. And perhaps not even that.
The same could be said about the story of Abraham. This is.nothing
more than a story. God did not address every reader but only Abraham,
just this specific person in a very specific situation. It is impossible to draw
general conclusions from this.
Is this a convincing argument? I do not think so. The story ofAbraham
has an unmistakably moral purpose and - I am afraid,,- the story of Phine-
has does as well. But even if we insist on denying this, there is still the
question ofwhether that denial is relevant. Because whatever the case may
be: extremists will read the stories as having moral significance.
A third difference between the Bible and the Koran that some people
present is that we have to take the attitude of the believers into account as
well. There may have been one Yigal Amir killing one Yitzak Rabin whilst
referring to a divine mission. But if that is the Jewish counterpart of the
Islamist suicide bomber, the example ofAmir dwindles into insignificance
compared with the examples from the Islamist tradition.
A fourth response coming from this third group will be that they will
point out that the Bible is mitigated by many other books and commentarw
ies. If we want to understand the Torah, we have to read the Talmud as
well. And the Talmud will teach us how to interpret the Torah. Once we
engage in this type of study it will be clear why Jewish terrorism pales in
comparison with Islamist terrorism.
What could be our reaction? Isn't this type of criticism fairly convinc-
ing?
I beg to disagree. Actually, those thinking along these lines have missed
the gist of the argumentation that has been developed here. I am not en-
gaged in a kind of empirical study about the dangers of respectively Islam-
ist, Jewish and Christian terrorism. What I try to understand is religious
terrorism as an important manifestation of religious evil. That the actual
danger this religious terrorism poses in some varieties of theism is much
greater than in others is true, but at the same time it is irrelevant. I side with
Bernard Lewis and other commentators in contending that the similarities
between the three theistic faiths on a doctrinal level are important for our
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analysis, even if the actual manifestations in tenns of vulnerability to ter-
rorist influences differ significantly (Lewis, 2003, p. 4).
What about the "two books-argument"? Isn't it clear that there is a dif-
ference in character between the Bible and the Koran? There may be an
element of truth in that, but the question is whether it is relevant. At least,
we should not overestimate the importance of this difference. The Koran is
composed ofmany suras. Those suras are commonly divided into the suras
from the period of Mecca and the suras from the period of Medina. Those
critical of Islam usually say that the Medina suras (usually more inclined
to condone the harsh practices that pose a problem to modem liberal de-
mocracies) have abrogated the harsher Meccan suras. But the apologists
answer that we should go back to the more "original" Meccan period to
find "pure Islam",
The second point mentioned before, viz. that the story of Phinehas is
a "story" is true, but it is a story with an unmistakably clear message. So
I do not agree with Robert Spencer who writes that the traditional under-
standing of the Koran is "far beyond the biblical idea that God inspired
human authors. Allah dictated every word of the Qur'an to the Prophet
Mohammed through the Angel Gabriel. Allah himself is the only speaker
throughout the Qur'an, and most often he addresses Muhammad, frequent-
ly telling him what to say to various adversaries" (Spencer, 2003, p. 127).
In my view Spencer underestimates the similarities between the three the-
istic faiths.
The problem is that if Holy Scriptures are, indeed, considered "holy"
and they contain only a small percentage of passages that incite violence,
those scriptures can still cause much harm. I already quoted Bemard Lewis
who said: "terrorism requires only a few" (Lewis, 2003, p. xxviii). He re-
ferred to the fact that we only need a few firm believers who are prepared
to do the dirty work. But we can also say: "terrorism requires only a few
passages in the holy book". If the holy book contains only a small percent~
age ofpassages invoking violence they pose a problem if the whole book is
considered to be holy and the word of God.
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